

Lecture #16

chapter 26

Money

and

Inflation

Money and Inflation: The Evidence

“Inflation is Always and Everywhere a Monetary Phenomenon” (*M. Friedman*)

Evidence

In every case when π high for *sustained period*, M growth is high

Examples:


1. Latin American inflations
2. German Hyperinflation, 1921–23

Controlled experiment, particularly after 1923 invasion of Ruhr—govt prints money to pay strikers, $\pi > 1$ million %


Meaning of “inflation”

Friedman’s statement uses definition of π as continuing, rapidly rising price level: Only then does evidence support it


and Money Growth in Latin America



German Hyperinflation: 1921–23



Response to Continually Rising M^s



Monetarist and Keynesian View

1. M continually, shifts AD to right from AD_1 to AD_2 to AD_3 , etc.
2. $Y > Y_n$, wages \uparrow , AS shifts from AS_1 to AS_2 to AS_3 , etc.
3. P continually rises from P_1 to P_2 to P_3 , etc.: i.e., have inflation

Monetarist and Keynesian Views of

Monetarist View


Only source of AD shifts and π in Figure 2 can be M^s growth

Keynesian View

Allows for other sources of AD shifts, but same conclusion that only source of *sustained* high π is M^s growth

1. Figure 3 shows that fiscal policy without M^s growth only causes $P \uparrow$, but not sustained
2. Figure 4 shows that supply shock does not lead to sustained


Response to One-Shot Increase in G



G permanently

1. AD shifts right to AD_2
2. $Y > Y_n$, AS shifts in to AS_2
3. P to P_2 , but doesn't keep rising


Response to Supply Shock



Negative Supply Shock

1. AS shifts in to AS_2
2. $Y < Y_n$, wages \uparrow , AS shifts back to AS_1
3. P unchanged, no


Cost-Push Inflation



High Employment Target at Y_n

1. Workers raise wages because either: want raise real wages or e high
2. AS shifts in
3. $Y < Y_n$, govt shifts AD out
4. Workers raise wages again, and go through steps 2, 3, and 4, etc.
5. P continually: i.e.. get

Demand-Pull Inflation



High Employment Target, $Y_T > Y_n$

1. $Y = Y_n < Y_T$, govt shifts AD out
2. $Y = Y_T > Y_n$, AS shifts in
3. $Y = Y_n < Y_T$, govt shift AD out, and repeat steps 2 and 3, etc.
4. P continually: i.e., get

Budget Deficits and

Government Budget Constraint

$$DEF = G - T = MB + B$$

1. Deficit financed by bonds, no effect on MB and M^s
2. Deficit not financed by bonds, MB and M^s

Financing persistent budget deficit by money creation leads to sustained

1. Deficit financed by M^s leads to AD shifts out, as in Fig 28.2
2. If deficit persists, M^s continually and get P continually, i.e.,
as in Fig 28.2

Conclusion: Deficit , only if it is

1. Persistent
2. Financed by money creation rather than by bonds

Budget Deficits and

Budget deficits in other countries

1. Bond finance hard
2. Deficit likely to lead to money creation and

Budget deficits in U.S.


1. Large capital market, so can bond finance
2. Fed has choice whether to monetize deficit, but may be pressure to do so
3. Ricardian equivalence may mean no effect of budget deficits on interest rates

Conclusion: Deficits not necessarily


Budget Deficits and Interest Rates

Price of Bonds, P
(P increases \uparrow)

Interest rate, i
(i increases \downarrow)




Inflation and Money Growth




1. Money and inflation relationship close until 1980
2. After 1980 relationship breaks down

Government Debt to GDP



1. Debt/GDP falls 1960–80
2. Deficits can't be source of money creation and

Unemployment and the Natural Rate of Unemployment



High employment targets source of 1960-80

1. $U < U_n$ 1965-73 suggests demand-pull , with $Y_T > Y_n$
2. $U > U_n$ 1974-80 suggests cost-push
3. $U > U_n$ and after 1980 result of Volcker deflation

Activist/Nonactivist Debate

Lags in Shifting AD

1. Data lag
2. Recognition lag
3. Legislative lag
4. Implementation lag
5. Effectiveness lag

Case for Activist Policy:

If self correcting mechanism is slow, $U > U_n$ for long time

1. Doing nothing has high cost
2. AS shift little, even after long lags in shifting AD

Conclusion: Should shift AD to AD_2 to get to point 2 in Figure 10

Case for Nonactivist Policy

If self correcting mechanism is fast

1. Doing nothing has low cost
2. AS shifts to AS_2 before AD shifts to AD_2
3. Sequence: 1', 1, 2', 2
4. Undesirable effect: Y and P fluctuate

Activist/Nonactivist Debate

Case for nonactivist policy stronger if expectations of policy matter

1. Economy won't stop at point 2
2. Wages \uparrow , AS in, $Y < Y_n$, AD shifted out, etc.:
3. Also less likely for wage push that gets us to 1'

Quite plausible that expectations of policy matter to wage setting

Rules Vs Discretion

1. Nonactivists advocate policy rule to keep AD from fluctuating:
Example: Monetarist constant-money-growth-rate-rule
2. Credibility of nonaccommodating policy helps avoid wage push and helps prevent \uparrow and unemployment

Example:

1. 1979 Fed had low credibility and anti- \uparrow policy was costly
2. Credibility earned by 1983
3. When money growth \downarrow 1983, little rise in wages and

Choice Between Activist and Nonactivist Policy

